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Background: The present study represents an initial attempt to assess the role of apathy in motivated decision
making on the Iowa Gambling Task. Clinical descriptions of patients with apathy highlight deficits in the cognitive,
emotional and behavioural aspects of goal directed activity, yet standard neurocognitive tests of these measures fail
to demonstrate reliable sensitivity to the disorder. Available research suggests the Iowa Gambling Task is a robust
test of complex emotional socio-executive processes involved in motivational decision making, which can analogue
real-world goal-directed behaviour.
Methods: We ask whether performance on the Iowa Gambling Task can distinguish brain damaged patients with
apathy symptoms from 1) brain damaged patients without apathy and 2) neurologically intact controls. Overall,
22 healthy adults and 29 brain damaged patients took part in this study.
Results: Brain damaged patients with apathy were distinctively impaired on the Iowa Gambling Task compared to
both non-apathetic brain damaged patients and neurologically intact healthy controls. On the other hand, standard
measures for the cognitive control of behaviour failed to show this sensitivity.
Conclusions: Our results demonstrated that the Iowa Gambling Task is sensitive to the presence of apathy
symptoms. We discuss these findings in terms of neurocognition deficits in apathy and the related implications for
rehabilitation and clinical intervention.
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Apathy as a syndrome manifests as reductions in motiv-
ation, goal directed thoughts, emotions, and behaviour [1].
The disorder is of frequent occurrence following neuro-
logical change [2]. Rehabilitation outcome studies on
chronic patients going beyond 2 years post brain injury
show that the majority of cases experience persisting
apathy symptoms with related psychosocial problems char-
acterised by lack of motivation, attenuated emotionality,
decreased social contact and leisure activity, unemploy-
ment, marital problems and family breakdowns [3]. Apathy
is also associated with significant caregiver distress and
early institutionalization [4]. Despite these serious clinical
implications, the nosological position of apathy and its
associated neurocognitive profile remain poorly under-
stood and appreciated in clinical practice [1].* Correspondence: Progress.Njomboro@uct.ac.za
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumNeurological models suggest apathy follows dysfunc-
tion in frontal-subcortical brain circuits crucial for
motivation-related executive processing [5,6]. The classic
case of Phineas Gage provides the earliest documented
case of such dysfunction. Despite his preserved capaci-
ties on basic cognition after his brain injury, Gage had
significant socio-executive deficits including personality
change and apparent apathy to his symptoms [7]. Similar
cases have been reported elsewhere, e.g., [8-11]. Apathy
is often conceptualised as a dysexecutive syndrome [12],
although studies have shown inconsistent results on the
relationship between apathy and executive deficits
assessed through standard executive function (EF) tests.
Some studies have reported an association between ap-
athy symptoms and poor performance on these tests
[13,14] while others have found no such an association.
For instance, a review by van Reekum and associates
[15] found a near middle split in the number of studies
that reported a significant relationship between apathytral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
Table 1 Lesion location and apathy diagnosis
Lesion IAES - 41 score cut off Total
Apathy No apathy
Left parietal 2 2 4
Right parietal 1 2 3
Bilateral parietal 1 0 1
Left fronto-temporal 1 3 4
Right fronto-temporal 3 1 7
Bilateral fronto-temporal 10 2 12
Total (N) 18 10 28
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did not (7 studies).
Use of different tests and scales on different clinical
samples across studies may partly account for the mixed
results. Also, in some cases real-life dysexecutive behav-
iour has been seen to dissociate from deficits on standard
EF tests [16-18]. Patients with significant functional pro-
blems often perform relatively well on these ‘offline’ tests
[19]. Robust tasks that are sensitive to real life socio-
executive processing may help us understand the nature
of neurocognitive impairment in apathy. The socio-
executive processing needed for successful Iowa Gambling
Task (IGT) performance is thought to analogue real life
motivated behaviour [20,21], and therefore makes a poten-
tially useful test for the deficits in goal directed behaviour
that comprise apathy symptoms.
A number of reasons make the IGT a plausible test for
apathy symptoms. Firstly, brain areas thought to subserve
emotional-executive processes crucial for effective IGT
performance such as the medial frontal regions, anterior
cingulate cortex, and amygdala form part of the cortico-
subcortical neural circuitry responsible for motivated goal
direct behaviour [22-28]. Damage to these areas reliably
causes apathy [29-35]. Secondly, apathy and impaired IGT
performance have both been linked to malfunctions of the
dopamine system. Blockade of dopamine has been
reported to impair, and stimulation of dopamine to im-
prove, IGT performance [36]. Enhanced IGT performance
due to stimulation of dopamine is also consistent with the
view that dopamine mediates exploratory behaviour and
the suggested effectiveness of dopamine agonists in com-
bating apathy symptoms [37,38]. With this converging evi-
dence, the IGT provides an attractive premise to build a
theoretical framework for understanding neurocognitive
correlates of apathy symptoms.
In this study we assessed whether the IGT is sensitive
to the presence of apathy symptoms in patients with
acquired brain damage. It is also possible that the pres-
ence of apathy symptoms may impair performance on
any test as a result of general motivational deficits. For
that reason, we also obtained independent EF measures
on the Brixton Spatial Anticipation test [39].
Method
Participants
In total 51 participants took part in the study. Twenty
nine brain damaged patients were recruited from brain
injury clinics in the West Midlands region of England.
Most neurocognitive studies on apathy have been done
on homogenous patient samples, thus making it difficult
to isolate the influence of the aetiological process, apathy
symptoms, and executive processing deficits. To increase
the power of the relationship between apathy symptoms
and socio-executive deficits, we profiled brain damagedpatients from a number of aetiologies (Cerebrovascular ac-
cident = 10; Head injury = 7; Anoxia = 5; Herpes Simplex
Encephalitis = 5; Aneurysm = 2). For this reason, the
patients’ lesions were also of varied locations. Lesion loca-
tion data for each of the patients was obtained from brain
scan information in the patients’ clinic files (See Table 1
for the lesion data).
Twenty-two healthy adult controls recruited through
local adverts in the West Midlands city of Birmingham
also provided the normative data on the IGT (See Table 2
for the participants’ demographic characteristics). All par-
ticipants gave informed written consent to participate in
the study. Ethics approval for the study was obtained from
the Birmingham and Solihull Research Ethics Committee.
Apathy symptoms
The informant version of the Apathy Evaluation Scale
(AES-I) [40] was used to assess apathy. The AES-I is an
18-item scale that assesses behavioural, emotional, and
cognitive aspects of apathy. Each item, (e.g., s/he gets things
done during the day) is rated on a scale of 1 (Not at all
characteristic) to 4 (A lot characteristic). The scale has
enjoyed widespread use and has good psychometric prop-
erties [40]. Patients’ caregivers provided the evaluations.
We took apathy scores of 41+ as indicative of the presence
of apathy (supplementary administration and scoring
guidelines obtained from the authors). To control for the
likely influence of depression on the relationships between
study variables, the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; [41])
was also used to evaluate levels of depressive symptoms in
the patient samples.
Executive function measures: the Brixton test
The Brixton Spatial Anticipation test [39] provided
standard EF measures. This test was chosen because of
its robustness and sensitivity to a variety of executive
deficits, including preservative behaviour and failure to
utilise feedback or follow rules [39].
Socio-executive measure: the Iowa gambling task
The IGT requires participants to choose cards from four
decks labelled A, B, C, and D. Each deck is made up of
Table 2 Participants age and education characteristics
N Mean SD Sig.
Age Control 22 (M=14; F=8) 44.00 18.60 p > .05
No Apathy 10 (M=7; F=3) 56.50 14.17
Apathy 18 (M=18; F=1) 53.06 14.04
Education Control 22 (M=14; F=8) 14.91 1.02 p > .05
No Apathy 10 (M=7; F=3) 14.40 0.84
Apathy 18 (M=18; F=1) 14.53 .90
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and B give high rewards (£100) on each card selection, but
also yield unpredictable and large losses such that con-
tinuously picking from these decks results in a net loss.
Decks A and B are therefore risky decks. On the other
hand, Decks C and D are safe. They give relatively lower
immediate gains on each picking (£50), but the associated
losses are also lower. Picking more cards from the safe
decks C and D gives a net gain, and picking more cards
from the risky decks A and B results in a net loss.
Because we used the non-automated card version of
the IGT, some of the patients ran out of play money at
various points after the 3rd Block (see below). Also, be-
cause the non-automated IGT version has fixed numbers
of cards for each deck, better performers ran out of safe
picks before reaching the final round of choices and had
to pick from the risky decks out of lack of choice. For
these reasons, we only analysed card choices up to the
60th round. While this is a potential limitation to our
study, it is important to note that in neurologically intact
subjects, the trend towards avoiding risky decks is often
set by the 40th choice [21].
Results
Tests for sphericity and homogeneity of variance were
performed on the data to determine whether it met the
assumptions for the use of parametric tests. Our data
met these assumptions.
Apathy evaluation
Nineteen patients (Male = 18, Female = 1; Mean age =
54, SD = 14.25) met criteria for the presence of apathy
(Mean apathy scores = 52.8, SD = 7.4) and 10 patients
(Male = 7; Female = 3; Mean age 56.5, SD = 14.17) did
not have apathy (Mean = 33.2, SD = 5.5).
Gambling task
To investigate the participants’ gambling trends, we
divided the rounds of choices into 3 blocks: Block 1
(rounds 1–20), Block 2 (rounds 21–40), and Block 3
(rounds 41–60). Neurologically intact controls picked
fewer safe cards (from decks C and D) in Block 1 (Mean
= 7.68, SD = 2.81); they then picked more safe cards inBlock 2 (Mean = 14.73, SD = 3.8) and even more safe
cards in Block 3 (Mean = 15.59, SD = 3.54). The same
trend towards picking more from the safe C and D decks
as the game progressed was also observed for non-
apathetic patients (Block 1: Mean = 9.1, SD = 3.54; Block
2: Mean = 11.40, SD = 4.69; and Block 3, Mean = 13.10,
SD = 6.0). In contrast, although on average apathetic
patients picked more safe cards in block 1 compared to the
other two groups (Mean = 10.21, SD = 3.46), they eventu-
ally picked fewer safe cards in block 2 (Mean = 8.95, SD =
4.43) and even fewer safe cards in block 3 (Mean = 8.05,
SD = 4.97). Figure 1 shows the mount of safe picks (from
decks C and D) for the 3 participant groups.
A mixed ANOVA performed on the safe (C+D) scores
for the 3 participant groups with Block (Blocks 1, 2, and 3)
as a within subject factor and Participant Type (Normal,
Non-apathetic, and Apathetic) as a between subjects vari-
able showed significant main effects of Block F(2, 98) =
31.10, p < .001, r = .24. The interaction between Block
and participant type was also significant F (2, 98) = 21.08,
p < .001, r = .39. When depressive symptoms (BDI score)
and executive function deficits (Brixton test scores) were
controlled for as covariates for the two patient groups,
there where non-significant effects of executive function
deficits F (1, 21) = 1.02, p > .05, r = .22, and of depressive
symptoms, F (1, 21) = .004, p > .05 r = .1. The effects of
Block remained significant, F (1, 21) = 3.81, p < .05 r = .45.
Further one way ANOVA tests on risky gambling
scores showed significant group differences (F (2, 48) =
9.20, p < .001 r = .41). Pairwise comparisons indicated
that apathetic patients made significantly more risky card
choices compared to both normal controls (Mean differ-
ence = 9.9; p < .001, r = .28) and patients without apathy
(Mean difference = 5.44; p < .05, r = .18). IGT scores for
the non apathetic patients were not significantly different
from scores for healthy controls (Mean difference = 4.1;
p > .05, r = .26). See Table 3 for these comparisons.
There is little consensus on the appropriate cut-off
score for the AES-I. Cut-off scores have ranged from 35
to 41 across studies (Glenn et al., 2002; Lane-Brown &
Tate; 2009). For this reason we also performed Pearson
correlation analyses between patients’ AES-I apathy rat-
ings and the total number of risky cards they selected.
The results showed a significant positive relationship be-
tween the level of apathy symptoms and the number of
risky cards selected, r = .38, p < 0.05. Figure 2 shows the
scatter plot for this relationship and illustrates the point
that patients with high levels of apathy also picked rela-
tively more risky cards.
Discussion
Patients with apathy made significantly more risky choices
on the IGT compared to neurologically intact and brain
damaged non-apathetic controls, both of whom (as groups)
Figure 1 The three graphs show less risky card selections for patients with apathy symptoms, patients without apathy and health
controls across Blocks 1, 2 and 3.
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The shift from risky to the safe decks shown by healthy
participants is in line with the performance patterns
reported in similar studies [42-47]. Non-apathetic brain
damaged patients also shifted towards good decks as the
game progressed.
It is possible that apathetic patients may perform poorly
due to their general lack of motivation, and not necessarily
due to a specific cognitive deficit related to the particular
task. This argument is however inconsistent with our find-
ings. For instance, putting in the Brixton test score as a
covariate did not dilute the effect, suggesting the two pa-
tient groups’ performance on this test was not significantly
different. We can claim with some degree of confidence
that the IGT is sensitive to the presence of apathy symp-
toms, and distinguished apathetic from non-apathetic
patients (and normal controls).
The IGT’s sensitivity to apathy symptoms makes it a
potentially valuable instrument for both research and
clinical practice. In a number of cases standard off-line
EF measures fail to distinguish between patients withTable 3 Pairwise comparisons on gambling task performance
healthy controls
Mean Difference
Apathetic vs. Non-apathetic 5.44
Apathetic vs. Normal controls 9.9
Non-apathetic vs. Normal controls 4.1real-life socio-executive deficits like apathy and those
without these deficits [48]. Standard EF tests may pro-
vide test takers with reliable task instructions and the
type of feedback that is not found in more complex real
life scenarios. On the other hand, the IGT has open
ended behavioural choices and requires the generation
of self-initiated choices under less explicit feedback.
Such conditions provide a more valid analogue of socio-
executive demands found in real life social environ-
ments. Our results suggest that apathy symptoms may
arise from specific deficits in a patient’s capacity to pro-
duce or structure their own goal directed behaviour.
This is in line with the realisation that apathetic patients
rely heavily on others to structure their own activities
[49]. Rehabilitation programmes in which daily tasks are
structured, with enough prompts and cues may benefit
patients with apathy. In this context, the IGT can be a
useful addition to assessment batteries for detecting
socio-executive deficits related to apathy.
Effective IGT performance is thought to depend on in-
tact emotional processing [50]. According to this viewbetween apathetic patients, non-apathetic patients, and
Std Error Significance
1.05 p < 0.05
0.84 p < 0.001
1.02 p > 0.05
Figure 2 The relationship between levels of apathy and the number of risky card selections.
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ance benefits from subconscious emotional capacities
that pre-bias responses away from bad behavioural
choices. This bias enhances the selection and efficient
execution of good behavioural choices, and is thought to
underlie adaptive goal-directed activity, reasoning and
decision-making in real life social contexts. It is tempt-
ing to suggest an inability to develop or fully utilise such
emotional biasing signals to explain apathy symptoms.
Empirical studies support this viewpoint. For instance, it
has been observed that patients with apathy show defi-
cits in matching emotional responses to social situations
[51,52]. Furthermore, there is evidence for a significant
inverse association between apathy and autonomic exci-
tation measured through heart rate reactivity [53]. Our
study is however limited in the extent to which we can
ascribe poor performance on the IGT to such lack of
autonomic emotional inputs because we did not obtain
concurrent measures of autonomic arousal.
The IGT’s sensitivity to apathy symptoms may also lie in
its requirement for sensitivity to rewards and punishments.
Part of the apathy symptom profile includes a dimension
of indifference to rewards and punishments, lack of inter-
est or concern, anhedonia, and social disengagement
[54,55]. Apathetic patients may have picked more risky
cards due to insensitivity to punishments. Bechara and col-
leagues [56] have however demonstrated that sensitivity to
rewards or insensitivity to punishment contingencies is not
enough to explain impaired IGT performance. They either
reversed rewards and punishments on the task such that
good decks yielded higher immediate punishments buteven greater delayed rewards, while risky decks gave off
low immediate punishments and even lower future
rewards, and in another condition increased the future dis-
advantages on risky decks. Patients with dysexecutive defi-
cits preferred decks that had low immediate punishment to
those with higher immediate punishment but more rewards
in the long run. In other words large delayed rewards failed
to lure the patients to the paying decks while on the other
hand the patients were reluctant to choose from decks with
huge initial punishment indicating that hyper sensitivity to
rewards or insensitivity to punishments might not be a cru-
cial factor on effective IGT performance.
Fellows and Farah [22] suggest that impaired goal direc-
ted behaviour can result from impaired future time per-
spective, which is a measure of an individual’s self defined
future. Interestingly, deficits in future time perspective were
found to correlate with self-reported apathy symptoms [22].
Whether this deficit can explain impaired IGT performance
in this study is a subject for future research. There are also
some suggestions that deficits in reversal learning or inhib-
ition could account for impairments on the IGT. Effective
performance requires that participants switch from initially
high paying decks to lower paying but also low punishment
decks. This involves reversal learning and the inhibition of
responses to high reward/high cost decks - capacities that
can be impaired in some brain damaged patients [57]. It is
unlikely that deficits in reversal learning or inhibition could
account for our results though, since apathetic patients
were not distinctly impaired on the Brixton test.
Other factors, such as the effects of working memory
deficits on IGT performance [58], and the cognitive
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to explain impaired performance on the task. However,
Bechara, et al. [61] have shown that working memory
and decision making are dissociable and also shown that
the majority of normal participants begin avoiding risky
decks before confessing awareness of the game’s rewards
and punishments contingencies. See also [62].
The IGT’s main weakness is its lack of specificity. A ma-
jority of different patient populations have shown deficits
on the measure. Impaired IGT performance has been
reported in schizophrenics [63-65]; in pathological gam-
blers [66]; in alcohol, marijuana, and substance dependent
individuals [67-69]; in anorexics [70] in patients with inter-
mittent explosive disorder and conduct disorder [71,72]; in
Huntington’s disease sufferers [24]; in traumatic brain in-
jury patients [73]; in frontotemporal dementia [74] and in
HIV infected patients [75]. It is nevertheless important to
note that apathy is also a common syndrome in most of
these disorders [15].
The IGT’s lack of specificity across different neuro-
psychiatric disorders could also be an indication of the
task’s sensitivity to a wider spectrum of deficits, for in-
stance, involving working memory, the patient’s interest
and concern about the game, the processing of reward
and punishment, explorative behaviour, and capacities
related to the inhibition of choices on highly paying but
risky decks.Conclusions
The IGT’s sensitivity to apathy symptoms makes it a poten-
tially valuable neurocognitive tool for assessing these symp-
toms. However the future utility of the task rests upon our
ability to isolate the potential causes of impaired perform-
ance in specific clinical populations and syndromes. This
should help unravel the individual aspects of the task that,
for instance, give it sensitivity to apathy symptoms. Future
studies may try and isolate or control for these various vari-
ables that can potentially impair IGT performance. Future
studies may also consider using the electronic version of
the IGT which allows the administration of the full 100
rounds even with poor or extremely good performers.
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